E.L. Zberovskaya.The mobilization of the German special resettlers into the Labour Army on Krasnoyarsk Territory during the 1940s

In accordance with the 1939 national census, 3962 Germans lived on the territory the evening before their deportation.¹ The compulsory resettlement of the Volga Germans at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War lead to a sudden increase of the population in Siberia, particularly in Krasnoyarsk Region. During the months of September and October 1941 more than 75000 people transported away from the Volga Region arrived there. The mass deportation favoured the geographic spreading of the Germans in so far as they were resettled in 42 districts all over the region. The special contingent had to cope with a longlasting adaptation phase. To make matters worse, this people suffered from continuous repressions practised by the authorities: deportations were carried out once again, the people were mobilized into the Labour Army.

The renewed compulsory migrations depended on the requirements of the social and economic development in the region, which, in the following, was in need of a permanent economic colonization. The mobilization of the special contingent into the Labour Army and the resettlement of people to the fishing areas of the far North, pushed the realization of the intended economical tasks ahead within a short time. The manifold forms of work the special resettlers were assigned to, expanded the spectrum of forced labour on Krasnoyarsk Territory, to where resettlers and prisoners had been sent already in the 1930s. Forced labour is inseparably connected with Soviet political repressions, in the course of which was developed an extensive system to exile entire ethnic groups during the 1940s.

Krasnoyarsk Territory had always attracted the interests of the state capital by its rich raw material deposits. Early in 1942 the government passes the famous decree about the promotion and development of the fishing industry along Siberian rivers, thus hoping to also accelerate the land reclamation of the northern territory. The labour mobilization of the special contingents who were to be sent to the north was well organized and went according to a strictly determined plan. Between May and July 1942 the authorities had registered 6312 Volga-Germans in their new places of residence. Among those, who had now been deported for the second time, were Letts, Finns, Greeks. By the end of navigability on the rivers, 23000 individuals had been transferred to the north by force.² As a result of the realization of such repeated deportations, the Germans happened to get to practically impassable places and only sparsely populated northern districts, thus causing the geographic spreading of their ethnos to an even larger extent.

In the far North the resettlers were assigned to work for the fish canneries or for kolkhoz farms specialized on fishing, but they were also organized into completely new cooperatives. It is a fact that, on the peninsula of Taymyr, 11 new enterprises were established in 1942 and 1943.

The task of solving the problems of housing and the organization of different jobs for the resettlers was primarily incumbent on the Krasnoyarsk Fishing Trust and the fish canneries in Igarka and Ust-Port. As documents prove they were unable to come to terms with these tasks – the allocation of work, the method of working and everyday life on the whole had not been thought-out at all. In their regular reports the fish canneries repeatedly pointed out to the representatives of the regional committee of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), who had escorted the resettlers’ caravans to the north, that the Fishing Trust was watching the scene without taking any action. “307 Germans and Letts debarked on Nosonovsk Island, Ust-Yeniseysk District. 27 days have passed since then, and so far they received nothing but three big fishing nets (after 23 days). The maximum number of people who can make use of the three nets is 54, while the remaining 253 individuals are sitting sit around without any work to do”.³ Under such circumstances the realization of the government decree “About the development of the fishing industry along Siberian rivers and in the Far-East” was jeopardized. In the summer of 1943 it was decided to organize fishing collectives in Turukhansk and Dudinka in order to change the situation. One of the most important tasks now was to support the newly organized cooperatives.

Relevant information on productive activities, number of workers and the ethnic structure of the labour pool in the new enterprises can still be obtained from archival materials which have been kept with the fishing collectives (s. Table 1).

Table 1. Ethnis structure of the kolkhoz farms belonging to the Taymyr Fishing Trust in 1944.

State Archives of Krasnoyarsk Territory, Fond R-1444, Inventory N°. 1, File N°. 5, Folio No. 17.

According to the information of the fishing collectives, the newly organized cooperatives were mainly international, but the majority of the resettlers were German and Russian families. They belonged to the workforce of the board of managers of the new fishing kolkhozes. In the districts of Dudinka and Ust-Yeniseysk, i. e. in the Autonomous Taymyr Region, deported Germans represented the biggest labour contingent which was to realize the government’s decision for a quick development of the fishing industry.

In the 1940s the local kolkhoz farms were also affected by the plans of the government to force this branch of industry along Siberian rivers without further delay. These farms were transferred from their agricultural field of activity to the fishing sector under compulsion. In close connection with these organizational proceedings, the former kolkhoz farms now had to set different priorities, too – the fishing industry was to be the dominating sector within the network of cooperatives from now on, while the importance of the traditional breeding of fur-bearing animals and reindeer was downgraded. That way, the elements of labour mobilization were also applied among the local residents.

The financial and technical basis for the new enterprises was provided with the aid of the mechanical fishing station. The cooperatives paid their work from the generated money. The fishermen syndicated into brigades and units. In accordance with the existing fishing equipment they split themselves into groups working with normal nets and groups using the huge nets available.

Fishing business was the most important work of the special resettlers, but not their only one. Shortly after they had been transferred into the new cooperatives, construction brigades were organized, for there was no adequate supply of housing space for the human contingent which had been brought to this place. The building of barracks by the aid of the resettlers was able to slightly extenuate the problem of lacking living space, but it could not resolve it completely.

The new cooperatives began to practice market gardening. However, due to the lack of financial support and technical supply the agricultural success of the resettlers was utterly modest and only partially answered to the problem of food supply at the expense of local financial means. The government was of the opinion that resettlers and local residents should guarantee for their catering by themselves. In a collective resolution made by the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on th 13 February 1944 “About the Development of Agriculture in Krasnoyarsk territory”, it was proposed to create one’s own market gardening station. The realization of this directive turned out to be difficult and went slowly. From among the 48 kolkhoz farms existing in the Taymyr Region in 1944, merely 12 were registered as adequate for the “cultivation of land”. Among those economically backward were the cooperatives of the special resettlers.⁴

Step by step the resettlers acquired different kinds of practical work as, for example, the trapping of wild animals and birds. These modes of employment counted among the additional means of income within the modest budget of the new cooperatives, and the seasonal character of the fishing business permitted the transfer of manpower to sectors outside the proper remit of the collectives.

Although the special resettlers were shock-workers, many of the new kolkhoz farms remained economically backward. The crop yields were poor in comparison to the results of the local farms. In 1943, for example, the local kolkhoz farm “Zapoliarnik” in Dudinka District generated proceeds in the total amount of 156172 rubles, while the newly organiozed cooperative “New Life” merely left a profit of 118637 rubles.4 We have to note that both labour contingents were equal in number. The considerable difference of gains resulted from the fact that the special contingent was mainly working for the fishing industry, where earnings and profits were rather low. The income was depending on the number of fish caught and delivered. At the receiving station the fishermen were reached out receipts about the quantity, as well as talons showing a fixed sum. Against presentation of the talons they were allowed to buy commodities and foodstuffs with the local stores. Even for those who had achieved more than the planned target, the income was entirely insufficient to cover at least the costs of the mostly needed foodstuffs. Their yearly income averaged 40% of the minimum living wage fixed by the kolkhoz organization.⁵ The local kolkhoz fishermen earned slightly more, but did not succeed to reach the set minimum, either.

The members of all fhsing collectives were confronted with the severe problem of survival. During the years of the forced development of the fishing industry (1942-1944) it became apparent that the low gainings resulting from this sector were unfit for the creation of an effective economy. The kolkhoz farms fulfilled the tasks determined by plan only once in a blue moon, for the People’s Commissariate set an unrealistic quota. To give an example: in 1943 the Taymyrsk fishing trust reported that the newly organized cooperatives fulfilled the plan by 43,7% - the local kolkhoz farms by 83%.⁶ The development of the fishing industry in the districts of the far North went on much slower than planned and expected by the People’s Commissariat of the Fishing Industry.

Did the transfer of the special contingent to the fishing sector yield the expected economic results? Was this kind of labour mobilization justified? Of course, we will not find any identical replies to these questions. On the one hand the repeated deportations brought forward the future social and economic development in the regions concerned. The ambitious efforts of the fishing industry in the years of 1942-1944 resulted in the increase of the fishing quota by two. On the other hand the formation of kolkhoz farms from among the special contingents did not bring about the expected results. The resettlers, abandoned to their fate, condemned to survive under such cruel conditions, were not in a position to develop an economically strong fishing industry and compete with the local kolkhoz farms.

Finally, in 1945, the fishing kolkhoz organizations owned up to the insanity of the effective development plan regarding the fishing enterprises. The reorganization of the local kolkhoz farms into fishing artels was declared wrong. The trend of earnmings had decreased considerably. Under such circumstances the continued existence of the resettler cooperatives was utterly doubtful and problematic. Their members stood up for an initiative to syndicate with the local kolhkoz farms, and the expanded enterprises went back to collective farming, by maintaining the fishing industry as one of their less significant fields of activity. The labour mobilizations of the special contingents contributed to the formation of a surveillance system. The final resettling of the Germans to the northern districts of the region was followed by an official, legally bound determination of their status of being special resettlers. Late in 1943 the fishing industry in these districts disposed of three commandants’ offices. They were operating in Taymyr, Khatanga and Igarka and kept all national contingents, which had been transferred to the far North, under their controll.⁷ Although the remoteness of the fishing villages did not permit the commandant to exercise a permanent surveillance on the deported individuals, this did not mean any change of the special resettler regime, for the people themselves did not have the possibility to be on the losse, either. Just the opposite – the scattered settlements were a long way away from eachother, so that the huge territory turned some of the commandants into uncontrollable bureaucrates with an unlimited authority. A significant example of the abuse of their authority is given by the attitude of the commandant of Khatanga, who even disregarded the official directives of the local NKVD District Committee: he anounced “that he has not directly responsible to anybody in Khatanga”. The legitimate organization of a special resettler system under the conditions of repeated deportations of national contingents was a subject of topical interest, for it reflected the ambition of the state to link these people to the new place of exile for a long period of time.

A special form of utilizing German manpower during the years of the war was the calling up of men (later women were mobilized into the Labour Army, as well) into so-called labour colonies. Such actions were also implemented on Krasnoyarsk Territory. By means of this mobilization the NKVD managed to partly resolve the problem of providing enough manpower for the enterprises closely connected to their own authority (the NKVD) and, apart from this, received a sufficiently mobile contingent of individuals fit for work, who accepted their subordinate role without making resistance. After the first call-up in January 1942 the military commissar of the region and the NKVD were able to send about 10000 German men at the age of 16 to 55 years into the “Labour Army”. Half of the mobilized were transported to the Kraslag near Reshety Station, to work for the wood processing industry, the remaining 5000 were taken to the Viatlag bei train.⁹ In March 1942 all Germans who had their permanent residence in the regions, autonomous and All-Union republics were mobilized into the labour army. Those among them, who had already been called-up before, came under the surveillance of the USSR NKVD, as well. However, not all Germans had to leave the region – 339 of them were taken to the Kraslag. The next call-up into the labour army took place in October 1942, when 6000 German men and women were assigned to work for the petroleum combines of the Kuibyshev Region and the trusts of the Bashkirian petroleum combine. Just as in other regions, people were not only sent away from Krasnoyarsk Territory – they also received labour armists themselves. In 1943 about one-thousand mobilized women from the Altai Region were put at the disposal of the Kraslag.¹⁰ Obviously, the utilization of Germans from other regions reduced the danger of attempts to escape, particularly with regard to mobilized women who might have tried to get back to their families. And it probably represents the only possible explanation for the fact that, approximately at the same time, 2000 German women from Krasnoyarsk Territory, who had already been working in labour colonies, were now sent to build the Dzhidinsk Tungsten and Molybdenum Combine (Dzhidlag). The authorities only ceased to mobilize Germans into the labour army in the second half of the year 1943.

Documents about former labour armists, which have been kept with the ten district military commissariates of the region, allow, up to a certain extent, some generalized presumptions about the age of the mobilized Germans. 3646 individuals were called up into the labour army in 1942 and 1943. Three quarters of them (2692) were males, one quarter (954) females. Their age structure was different. In general the males were “older”. Boys under 18 represented a percentage of 15%. The female contingent was “younger”. The percentage of girls who had not yet reached the age of 18 was 28%. Evidently, this difference was due to the fact that women with infants were not taken into the Labour Army. However, the authorities were not at all lenient towards men at that time.

The mobilization of German youngsters and women leaves a particularly great impression before the background of other national groups of labour armists.Thus, the contingent of labour armists called up from among people of Russian nationality was also mainly a male one (6926). Females were less often teken into the labour army (873). Young people merely represented a percentage of 1,6%. It stands to reason that the military commissariates preferred to call up young girls to work for the labour army. Their share within the female contingent was 16%. The information material used here, basically reflect the politics of the authorities towards the German contingent. Since none of the Germans was called up to fight for the Red Army, all male representatives of German nationality up to 18 years were just mobilized into the “Labour Army”. German women met a hard fate, too. Many of them were forced to work in labour colonies, although they were not of full age.

Mobilized German women were also forced to do hard labour within the region. Some of them happened to get to the port of Krasnoyarsk, where they were to load and unload ships. Others were needed for the construction of the aerodrome in Kansk. The majority of German males were working for the timber industry, felling trees and sawing or chopping wood in the forced labour camp sub-sectors. These camp sectors belonged to the GULAG system and hardly differed from other NKVD camps. The whole regime of the Kraslag, as well as the assignment of Germans to work there, had been determined by a corresponding order of L. Beriya, the People’s Commissar of the Interior, on th 12 January 1942: the decree “About the organization of units of German labour armists under the responsibility of the NKVD camps of the USSR”. The demobilization of the labour armists began only in 1946. However, during the first time, this meant nothing else but the possibility of leaving the inner camp zone, as well as the right to send for one’s family. The process of changing from the category of “mobilized” individuals into the state of special resettlers took place early in the 1950s.

Giving the concluding remark it should be mentioned that the mass mobilization of Germans represented the continuation of the politics of repression applied by the state towards representatives of this nationality. Besides their repressive character they also had a definite economical function. The forced labour done by the different deported peoples illustrated the mobilisation character of Soviet economy, which, in peacetime and at war, used unique methods to recruit unvoluntary workers, in order to fulfil its most important economic tasks - although the question of economic usefulness and necessity did not belong to the most essential items. All decisions were based on the political will and arbitrariness of the Soviet administration. On Krasnoyarsk Territory we find both combinations of forced labour among deported Germans, which is rather unusual for other regions. With the utmost probability we may say that the mobilizations of German resettlers in to the labour army, which started in 1942, accelerated the process of forming a sophesticated system of surveillance practiced by the NKVD with regard to the corresponding contingents.

Annotations:

1. States Archives of Krasnoyarsk Territory, Fond 1300, Inventory 12, File 37, Folio 125.
2. Center of the Preservation and Study of documents of contemporary history of Krasnoyarsk Territory, Fond 26, Inventory 3, File 463, Folio 107.
3. Ibidem, Folio 64.
4. States Archives of Krasnoyarsk Territory, Fond 1444, Inventory 1, File 9, Folio 5.
5. Ibidem, Fond 1445, Inventory 1, File 71, Folio 23.
6. Ibidem, Fond 1444, Inventory 1, File 12, Folio 20.
7. Ibidem, Inventory 24, Folio 107, 108.
8. Department of Special Archival Holdings and Rehabilitations of the Information Center of the Authority of the Interior (Krasnoyarsk Territory), Fond 6, File 1, Table 2.  Official directives of the NKVD administration in 1943, p. 38.
9. Ibidem, File 3, Table 1, Official directives of the NKVD administration in 1944, p. 123.
10. Ibidem, Table 1, File 1, Official directives of the NKVD administration in 1945, p. 6.
11. “Germans are to be mobilized into labour colonies … J, Stalin”: Collection of Documents (from the 1940s) / Contents, Preface, Comments, Historical Sources, Professor N.F. Bugai – 2. edition, Moscow, 2000, p. 261

Author: Elena Leonidovna Zberovskaya, senior lecturer, chair of general history, Krasnoyarsk State University of Pedagogics.
e-mail address: zberovskiy@mail.ru

Published in: “The Germans in Siberia: History, language, culture” - documentary material of the International Sientific Conference, Krasnoyarsk City, 13–16 October 2004.
Responsible editor: V.A. Diatlova, Krasnoyarsk, 2005. – p. 46-50.

Home