E.L. Zberovskaya, candidate of historical science,
lecturer of the chair of general history,
V.P. Astafev-Pedagogic State University, Krasnoyarsk
The study of the history of stalinism has made considerable progress during the past decades, due to the “opening” of materials which had formerly been declared stricly confidential. Researchers succeeded in making considerable progress with regard to the revelation of the real nature of “mobilization”-economy and the transformation of social structures within the Soviet society; they managed to adduce evidence that the regime was of a repressive character, part of which was the system of forced displacement in line with the Soviet enforcement of sentence.
Being aware of the interrelations of forced displacement and reprssions, today’s historians point out that that the forced resettlement of masses of people of different social groups became a universal remedy to solve a whole complex of problems, which came up in the young, dynamically altering Soviet society1. Betaking itself to the means of deportation, the power did not only neutralize the morally and politically unreliable contingent, but also served up the “discharge” of social tensions in the places from which the people were deported. These circumstances are partiularly obvious in connection with the post-war resettlements from districts annexed by the USSR. Thus, the families of all those who had offered active resistence against the provisions of the new power, were deported from West-Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic States for the purpose of forced resettlement: the families of convicts and killed individuals, who had been in the state of nationalists or bandits, as well as kulaks. Having arrived in the new places of settlement in Siberia and Middel Asis the deportated citizens were put under supervision of special security officers an commandants’ offices, which had already been in existence since the 1930s. Particularly the special resettlement departments, which wielded their power within the administrations of the Ministry of the Interior in the republics, regions and districts after the war, “supervised” all areas of life of the forced resettlers – from their assignation to work, social tendencies and opinions up to the family situation of the deportees. Nowadays, the partly published materials of the central archives and documents discovered in regional depositories allow us to speculate about the system of forced resettlement as a means to satisfy the needs of the Stalinist system with regard to the liquidation of social and political problems. The present article is dedicated to an extensive survey of this question.
The forced resettlement systems in the Krasnoyarsk Territory was one of the
biggest of its kind after the war: in 1952, under the supervision of 192
commandants’ offices, 174134 forced resettlers resided in this area. Theywere
mainly representatives of so-called national “special contingents” – Soviet
Germans, Lithuanians, Letts, Estonians, Kalmuks and others2.
As for this characteristics the region played the leading role compared toother Siberiandistricts. An also very big number of deported citizens could also be found in the Kazakhian and Uzbek SSR3. Thus, the resettlement system practiced in the Krasnoyarsk Territory in the 1940s and early 1950s reflects in many respects the common situation, which is characteristic for such structures; at the same time it allows for finding an answer to the asked question.
The dispersed settlement of the deportees entailed certain consequences for the regions. On the one hand they gained additional manpower, which, under the conditons of a quick development and exploitation of Siberia and Middle-Asia, they were in urgent need of. On the other hand, caused by the arrival of such a mass of people, the local authorities and the NKVD / MVD organs were confronted with a series of problems with regard to the accomodation and orientation of the “special contingents” on site, etc.
The conditons of life of the resettlers were determined and exactly defined by the Center in Moscow by various directives. The whole complex of measures intended by the Soviet government took account of the creation of material and general conditions of life, which would guarantee the survival of the people under the new climatic conditions and their future admission to the production process.
The materials held back by the archives of the Krasnoyarsk Territory for such along time prove that the local persons in charge were unable to solve all arising problems concerning the forced resettlers. The main reasons for the striking lack of willingness to make decisions in the range of material and general conditions of life were the economic difficulties of the war and post-war times and the unscrupulousness of some local chief operating officers. On the whole, the deported families proved themselves as the weakest and most vulnerable part within the whole situation. Facts about disorganization in everyday life were recorded by examination boards every now an then. Fromone of these notes taken in April 1949 we read the following: “250 families of evacuated special resettlers – Germans, Kalmuks, representatives of the Organization of Ukrainian nationalists - live in the area of the “Kemskoe” sovkhoz, Kazachinskoe District, under eclusively bad cirumstances. On the average, one individual has to make do with a living space of maximum 1,5 square meters, which in most cases are not even suitable for habitation; moreover, 20 persons live in half-decayed dugouts. Due to the lack of space und the miserable-looking accomodations, the people are forced to live under unacceptable, entirely insanitary conditions”4. The personnel of the departments of special resettlement who were supervising the deportees, were principally not in a position to achieve any changes of the situation. Concerned about the livesof the labor force concerned, they were authorized to approach the local officers with the request to impose an administrative penalty on the culprit – because of “the revelation of defects and serious grievances in the supply and care for the resettlers”.
Thus fulfilling its social-political tasks for the neutralization of the “politically unrelieable” contingent in the exile regions, the Soviet leaders practically provoked the raising of new problems in the places of deportation. The longlasting desorganization in everyday life retarded the social adaptation of the resettlers and intensified their feeling of being without protection and help and of being treated unjustly.
In the course of all those years of the existence of these systems of special resettlement there was the possibility of two main social-political conflicts in the regions, where special contingents” abounded. The special resettlers experienced social injustice immediately after their arrival in the places of exile in a particularly fierce way. As a general rule the former citizens were accomodated in rural areas, there previous professions (although there often was a great lack of them in Siberia) were not taken into consideration at all, and the exiles were not even allowed to speak in their mother tongue. The reality of the new allday life was understood as a manifestation of discrimination on the part of the state in connection with individual social groups. In the autumn of 1941 the staff members of the VKP (B) district committees mentioned in their written reports the sharp opinions of some German resettlers. “They did not take us to Siberia to life, they want us to die; in our Republic we were prospering, and when we came here they promised us that we would “receive grain and cattle in your new place of residence” and that we would “live just in the same way as before”. But we received nothing, and we are not going to receive anything in the future, either. And it’s a moot question whether we will manage to stay alive”.6
These social tensions arose from illegal actions of the authorities which had deprived the deportees of the right of freedom of movement within the regions of the new settlement area (command of the Council of Ministers dated the 8 January 1945)7. Each change of location was to be registered with the commandant’s office. In accordance with the ukase of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 26 November 1948 they authorities could assess a penalty of 20 years of compulsory labour in case of an attempt to escape8. The special settlers valued the deterioration of the regime in different ways. However, in their social environment one negative sentence was always circulating unanimously: “ We are tired of the Soviet power, it terrifies us with all its ukases. Nonetheless, we will live as we want to”9.
The adverseness of the special resettler status, which was entirely new for them, and the attitude of the Soviet regime towards them became particularly evident with the deported former residents of the Baltic republics. Many of them persistently refused to join the local kolkhoz farms even 5-7 years after the had been resettled10. Some Lithuanians openly explained their attitude and position in the middle of the 1950s in letters addressed to relatives abroad: “You have to keep an eye on all Russians; you sometimes have to brace yourself in order to suppress the desire to take everything away from the Russians – in return. But you better calm down and put your clenched fist back into the pocket of your jacket”.
Archival documents prove that the authorities in the Moscovitan Center and the places in question were very well aware of the dangerous situation occurring in connection with the raising of social conflicts in the special resettlement areas. Various measures were taken to suppress and avoid them. All arriving “special contingents” were “dispersed” over the territoty of the region in the true sense of the word. 30-50 Volga Germans were to live in one settlement only, 60-100 kalmucks and no more than 10-20 of the Vlassov people, who were considered as “particularly unreliable” people12. The special commandants and their assistants were actively recruiting agents from among the special resettlers. The widely ramified network of agents tightened and soon informed the supervisory body any occurrence of resentment and displeasure among the deportees or special resettlers, who were just making preparations to escape. The assistantsof the commandant’s officers mentioned in their denunciations that the recruiting of agents and informants from among resettlers of the Baltic States went utterly slow and withonly little “success”13
A particular roll for the removal of social problems was assigned to an “intensified political education”. Conversations, lectures, Soviet cine films about the advantages of socialism were to become the miost important instruments of education of the special settlers. In order to be able to realize this awareness training the local party organs were availed themselves of communists and komsomol members from among the special resettlers. Documents kept with the archives show that the propaganda campaign was dull and mainly developed in bigger towns. Thus, the measures to neutralize social discontent of the resettlers in their new places of residence had different effects. Presumably, the permanent total control on the part of the special resettlement authorities the check on the deportees, turned out to be the most effective means, in other words – the deprivation of freedom of movement. On the whole public mass protests among special resettlers inKrasnoyarsk were not mentioned by the authorities. Their discontent often ended in passive resistence and escape from the compulsory places of residence, the organization of religious groups, refuse to go out to work, etc. – all these die not represent any serious danger.
Thus, the Soviet power believed to be able to solve social-political problems by deporting mass contingents for compulsory settlement. But the huge stream of deportees caused new problems in the new places of residence and the special resettlers, now far away from home, did not appear to be loyal towards the authorities oppressing them. Being under the permanent control of special commandants the resettlers were forced to make the best of a bad bargain with the loss of their previous social status and the new situation in which they had no longer “equal rights”.
1. V.N. Zemskov: Special resettlement in the USSR, 1930-1960 / V.N. Zemskov –
Moscow, 2003, - p. 280; N.F. Bugai: The peoples of the Ukraine in “Stalin’s
special file” / N.F. Bugai – Moscow, 2006, - p. 7.
2. Department of special funds and rehabilitation (DSFR) of the GUVD Information
Center of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, Index of the allocation of the settlement
areas of special resettlers, exiles and deportees in the Krasnoyarsk territory
on the 1 January 1952.
3. V.N. Zemskov, Special resettlers in the USSR… - p. 213.
4. Archival agency of the Administration of the Krasnoarsk Territory, record
P-1386, index 4, file 134, folio 14.
5. DSFR of the GUVD Information Center of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, record 6,
file 2, folio 1. Commands of the NKVD administration in 1941, p. 36.
6. Archival agency of the administration of the Krasnoarsk Territory, record 26,
index 3, file 105, folio 8.
7. The history of the Russian Germans in documents (1763-1992) // authors: V.A.
Auman(n), V.G. Chebotareva, Vol. 1 – Moscow, 1993 – p. 176.
8. Ibidem
9. V.N. Zemskov, Special resettlement in the USSR, … p. 163.
10. Archival agency of the Administration of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, index
29, file 4, folio 35.
11. Ibidem, index 30, file 2, folio 328.
12. Ibidem, record R-2137, index 1, file 99, folio 101,102,105; record R-1386,
index 4, file 71, folio 34; Index of the allocation of the settlement areas of
special resettlers, exiles and deportees in the Krasnoyarsk Territory as per 1
January 1952.
13. State Archive of the Russian Federation, record R-9479, index 1, file 471,
folio 234.